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Christianity and Society

- Economic Ideology and Economic Policy

WILLIAM J. MCKINSTRY

- Signs of Health and Disease in the Political Community

CHARLES D. KEAN

- American Foreign Policy in the Light of Christian Realism

H. VANB. CLEVELAND

- Symposium: Ethics, Theology, and Public Policy

- Editorials

- Book Reviews

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

A Quarterly devoted to Christianity and Social Reconstruction

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Table of Contents

	PAGE
Editorials	3
Economic Ideology and Economic Policy by William J. McKinstry	7
Signs of Health and Disease in the Political Community	13
by Charles D. Kean	
American Foreign Policy in the Light of Christian Realism	17
by H. VanB. Cleveland	
Symposium: Ethics, Theology, and Public Policy	25
by George D. Younger Edward LeRoy Long, Jr. Francis O. Ayers	
Book Reviews	29

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Robert McAfee Brown's contribution to the Symposium will appear in a forthcoming issue of *Christianity and Society*.

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CHRISTIANITY and SOCIETY

EDITORIALS

European Integration

The success of the London conference in integrating European defense after the collapse of the EDC proposal should teach all the statesmen and nations of the free world a lesson. The EDC was at first proposed by France and it was supported by American prestige with too little reservation. It proved unacceptable to France in the end though this was not certain until Mendès-France's forthrightness brought the matter to an issue.

We should all have known as we did not that France would not accept the EDC because it required a sacrifice of sovereignty of all nations, but the sacrifice fell particularly upon France. Germany could use the EDC as a way of restoring her sovereignty while France alone among the great nations was asked to make a real sacrifice—an explicit renunciation of national sovereignty which is probably beyond the moral competence of any nation. International arrangements necessary for a common defense all require implicit limitations of sovereignty. This is just one more instance in history which proves that national sovereignty must be eroded yet cannot be explicitly disavowed.

But the problem of France was even more complex. It was difficult for her to be enclosed in an intimate partnership with her ancient foe Germany when that partnership specifically excluded her ancient ally Great Britain. It is easy to be wise after the fact but now that history has enrolled its wisdom we ought to be ashamed of not having recognized these hazards to the unification before the French Assembly brought them to our attention. The collapse of the EDC proposal made another policy imperative and Great Britain came to the rescue with a proposal for using NATO as the basis of the partnership. The proposal was made the

more palatable to France by the British offer to maintain its troops on the continent as long as France desired. Thus the last obstacle to French participation in the European partnership disappeared and the proposal was not less acceptable to Germany because of this fact. Thus the redemption of the project for European unity must be regarded as a triumph of British statesmanship and more particularly of Anthony Eden's statesmanship. The inclination of the Eisenhower Administration to claim credit for the achievement is rather laughable and is being laughed at in Europe. We had put all our eggs into the basket of EDC and we could not have extricated ourselves or Europe from the EDC debacle without help.

The problem of German unity, of course, remains and we will have to be more resourceful than we have been in the past to counter the Russian efforts to play on the natural desire for German unity among the Germans in order to defeat the hopeful developments toward European unity.

R. N.

Evanston on the Economic Order

There is likely to be a good deal of debate in Christian Action circles concerning the Evanston report on "The Responsible Society." This report came from the section which was the successor to the section at Amsterdam which wrote the famous report on communism and capitalism. The reaction against the criticisms of capitalism in the Amsterdam report, based often on the mistaken idea that Amsterdam intended to condemn both capitalism and communism in the same way, has caused conservatives in this country to watch carefully the positions

taken on the same subject at Evanston. *The Chicago Tribune* noted with relief that the report of Section III resembled the G.O.P. platform of 1952 more than it resembled the Amsterdam report. *The Christian Century*, while not necessarily agreeing with the *Tribune*, has said that this Evanston report is as far to the right as major church bodies are ever likely to swing. It prophesies that "the pendulum of church thinking on social issues will swing back to the left." *The New York Times* emphasized in its report from Evanston the support given by this section to free enterprise.

In order to understand this report it is necessary to know that two things have happened since Amsterdam which influenced the discussions at Evanston. The first was that those who had been most responsible for the Amsterdam report came to realize that it had been a mistake to use "capitalism" as the symbol to put over against communism. This was a mistake because the word "capitalism" is completely ambiguous. Its meaning in Europe is ideological and there it refers to a spirit and a way of life, to a doctrine of economic individualism. In the United States capitalism refers to a highly successful and very fluid type of economic organization which now takes a form which is quite remote from the picture of capitalistic institutions in the minds of people in both Europe and Asia. So, it was resolved at Evanston to avoid any general use of capitalism as a concept. Actually the Evanston report takes for granted an economy in which the state plays an important role and every one of the specific criticisms of capitalism in the Amsterdam report is applied in various ways to existing economic institutions. But it does make a great difference to avoid the use of the word because of its ambiguity.

The other thing that happened after Amsterdam in ecumenical circles and which closely paralleled developments in the thinking of Christian Action was a growing appreciation of free enterprise, a tendency to reject the idea that a consistent socialization of the economy would be an advance. Readers of this journal can recall much discussion of changes of thought on this subject.

This trend in ecumenical circles has not come only as a result of American influence. Even the Socialists in Europe have come to recognize elements of validity in it. Free enterprise has proved to be favorable to production and to the maintenance in society of many centers of power and initiative. The Evanston report reflects this point of view. But it is kept in balance with emphasis upon the economic functions of the state. The Evanston report can be used against the tendency that is common in this country to regard the state as the chief enemy of freedom and to identify Christianity with capitalism or with free enterprise as a consistent system. *The Christian Century* says that the report is too balanced in this respect. It is hard to see how one can write anything that has validity for many different countries without keeping the kind of balance which Evanston has preserved as soon as the universal claims of socialism as a total system have been abandoned.

There is danger that in taking this kind of line the Church will become tame and conservative. Bold pronouncements with a strong socialistic slant could be counted on to keep those who wrote them in conflict with existing society. This often seemed to be prophetic but it was mistaken. This report tries to pin point more accurately the real conflicts between the Christian ethic and economic institutions.

There is a possibility that, while Christian economic thinking which was formed in large part by the experience of the depression in the 1930's, the thinking that is reflected in this report will seem twenty years from now to reflect post-war prosperity. The pendulum may swing back but it is not likely to swing the whole way because current thinking reflects more than the prosperity of the 1950's. It reflects also the experience of men in our time with totalitarianism which necessarily drives us to take more seriously the need of distributing power in society. Also it reflects experiences with moderate forms of socialism which have proved even to socialists that there is no one cure-all for the ills of society. This report recognizes that new conditions may require more emphasis on state

initiative than is needed today. But it says that "state action needs to be decentralized, limited, and adaptable." In saying that it is giving expression to a lesson that has been learned in the hardest possible school. Discussion of this report will be most fruitful if we can avoid seeing it in terms of symbols and patterns suggested by such words as "right" or "left." The deepest intention of the report was to call Christians away from such stereotypes.

J. C. B.

Britain and America in World Leadership

Everyone, at least in the Anglo-Saxon world, concedes that the peace of the world depends upon the two great Western nations, Great Britain and the United States. Usually we Americans assume also that we are the more important because of our greater power in this dual leadership. But recent events reveal that our superiority in power is probably a hazard rather than a gain to the free world, for it is obvious that Britain is certainly endowed with superior political wisdom and patience in the difficult job of leading an alliance of free nations embattled with an unscrupulous foe. Whether it is the more extended experience or the peculiar conditions of our several histories which gives Britain a superior wisdom, it becomes daily more clear that Britain is more trusted than we are both in Asia and in Europe. The preference in Asia is the more remarkable. Here resentments against her former imperialism have given way to trust of partners in a common commonwealth.

The immediate issue which reveals these preferences is that of coexistence. Ostensibly we believe in coexistence, since no responsible statesman believes in a preventive war. But there are so many wild men among our less responsible leaders that the world is not certain about our steadiness. Many believe that we are more intent on winning an eventual war than in avoiding a global war. It was significant that it required Winston Churchill's visit to our shores to bring the dreaded word "coexistence" out into the open. We were supposed to be against it because the communists favored it.

The immediate issue which brings the respective attitudes of the two nations to a head is the admission of China to the United Nations. We are firmly opposed to this policy. We regard it as a kind of appeasement. The British want China admitted in order to remove her as much as possible from Russian tutelage. If they are wise they will not expect an obvious rift between China and Russia which are bound by ties of firm Marxist orthodoxy. But in time the interests of the two nations cannot be completely identical. We ought to have the chance to explore and widen the points of divergence, even as Russia seeks to widen the rift between us and Europe.

When this issue came before the United Nations this fall Britain supported us in postponing it. Britain obviously thought she could afford to wait until the inflexibility of American opinion was softened somewhat by world events. Meanwhile it was significant that we asked only for a postponement of the issue and that we warned the Nationalists against adventures against the mainland and emphasized that we supported them only in a defensive strategy. In spite of our brave talk of "liberation," our military chiefs are as reluctant as the previous ones of being bogged down in a war in China. Perhaps Britain was also waiting out a Democratic victory in November knowing that it would remove a great deal of the extremist Republican pressure which is upon the Administration.

Of course it has long been obvious that Britain does not stand alone on this issue. The real point of the situation is that Britain's policy represents both Europe and Asia. The whole world in fact is fairly well agreed on this policy. It awaits a change in our mood as an indigent nephew waits for a propitious moment to have his way with a cantankerous but rich uncle.

The issue of the EDC which the French Assembly killed is as revealing of the contrast between American and British methods in Europe as the issue of the admission of China into the United Nations is in Asia. We had staked all on the EDC which, when defeated, left us paralyzed for further action.

But meanwhile Anthony Eden made a

trip through the continent with the proposal for an enlarged NATO and with the promise to maintain British troops on the continent. That promise clinched the proposal's success. So we have a unified European defense today including the whole Atlantic community. This evidences that, as in other procedures so in international affairs, there are more ways than one to solve the necessary problems to achieve the desired goals. We ought to acquire more flexibility in international relations if our leadership is to be useful to the world.

R. N.

Is Tyranny Changing in Russia?

Recently the *New York Times* correspondent in Russia, Mr. Salisbury, returned home and gave an interesting report on his experiences in Russia. The most interesting part of his account was in the initial chapters in which he reported on the new reign of terror which Stalin was contemplating at the hour of his death and of which many of the members of the present government were the prospective victims. They were in such danger, in fact, that there is always the possibility that they may have "hastened" his death instead of being saved by its fortuitous circumstance. At any rate, Malenkov and Beria were obvious partners in the first reshuffling of power. But Beria overplayed his hand, scared the army and was liquidated by a partnership of the army and Malenkov.

The army incidentally maintains its ascendancy in the present power relations and it seems to be Zhukov, the friend of Eisenhower rather than the political general, Bulganin, who has the real power. Thus the army assumes the role which it usually has in tyrannies and from which Stalin alone was powerful enough to banish it.

One of the most hopeful elements in the present situation is the power of the army, for modern armies are hardly ever intent upon war. They know the hazards of war and are inclined to vote for peace. The analogy in the United States is the conserva-

tive temper of the Army Chief of Staff, General Ridgeway, as contrasted, for instance, with Admiral Radford who was all for involving us in the Indo-Chinese war.

Perhaps Mr. Salisbury is a little too sanguine about the hopefulness of the Russian developments, particularly of the temper of the "collective leadership" as contrasted with Stalin who obviously suffered from the delusions which usually visit tyrants in their old age. This collective leadership is defined by Salisbury as a "junta." This junta is actually not very secure in its seat of power. Someone besides Beria may ultimately lose his head in the politics of tyranny. The fact that the shift in power was made with no obvious diminution of the power of the tyranny rather dampens the hope of those who expected totalitarianism to fall headlong over the problem of succession.

The more important question is whether the new leadership offers any more hope of peace than Stalin. We have a good deal of evidence on that question in addition to Salisbury's reports. The evidence is that post-Stalin Russia has sought to relieve tensions and to restrict its commitments where its power was over-extended. But it is true that the new Russia is as difficult to bargain with as the old. After all, the bargaining agent is always the same man, Molotov. Yet there is reason to believe that the danger of heedless action has materially decreased.

The Russians will press an advantage wherever they find a weak spot in our defenses. They will use whatever means are available, whether military, political, or conspiratorial, for the purpose. But there is good reason to believe that they do not want a general war. Developments in Russia, in short, give validity to the British plea for giving coexistence "a good try," in Churchill's phrase. We must be under no illusions about the attractiveness of coexistence. The prospects are grim. The foe is ruthless. The burdens in sacrifice and patience are very great. The only thing in favor of coexistence is that the conscience of the free world cannot accept the alternative. It could not accept the alternative even if it did not mean mutual annihilation, which it certainly does.

R. N.

Economic Ideology and Economic Policy

WILLIAM J. MCKINSTRY

A concern for the economic aspect of man's existence has often been voiced by those who over the centuries have molded the social thought of Western civilization. Characteristically, however, economic relationships were accorded a peripheral, if sometimes detailed, attention until the close of the Middle Ages. Economic relationships were discussed by way of providing depth of field for the main objects of focus which were right conduct and the institutions felicitous to "the good life" or "salvation."

In the succession of cultural upheavals that accompanied and followed the breakup of feudalism, economic activity as such became of increasingly central importance in men's lives. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, aided by the powerful rationalization afforded by Adam Smith and his successors, the "self-regulating market" seemed on the way to becoming a central organizing institution of Western society. In our own time and nation economic processes and the individual's role in them have obviously retained high importance.

With these developments has come an enlarged concern with formulating government economic policy. It has been in response to the need for such policy that the great contributions to economic thought have generally been made. Doctrine has been the handmaiden of policy. As one writer has put it, economic thought has occupied the dual role of partly interpreting and partly inspiring economic development.

The perspective brought to economic problems by citizens concerned with policy is important. At best, each of us has a partial view of the arrangements of this world. But the views that prevail will profoundly influence the arrangements as policy is hammered out. In a dynamic civilization, it is to be expected that institutions and theories will be modified over time. But programs of action that are not rootless and do not lead to capricious change must be carefully checked against the benchmarks of prevail-

ing institutional patterns and the body of theorizing about them that is available. In diagnosing economic ills and prescribing economic action there is no substitute for a systematic view of the whole functioning economy. Received economic analysis, while inadequate in many ways, is a vital point of departure in forging economic policy.

The main stream of economic thought is usually traced to Adam Smith. The forces sweeping economic processes to center stage had been at work long before his time, and many of the central ideas of *The Wealth of Nations* were "in the air" of his time. What was original was the systematic definition and treatment of "the economic problem" in its broadest form. Economists trace their professional lineage to Smith because they substantially share his general way of looking at economic processes.

Smith lived at a time when a system of economic planning was yielding to a rising business individualism. He was deeply concerned with the conflict between government directives and individual initiative. His reflections convinced him that the objective of increasing the national wealth (income) was better served by allowing each person to pursue the course of greatest gain to himself, than by a comprehensive set of regulations. This was because the profitable course for the individual usually (but not always) would be to create the products most desired by the whole community and to do so in the most "efficient" way in terms of resources used. Against the background of this concept, and that of the division of labor, Smith sketched the broad outlines, and subsequent contributors filled in the details, of a market system which reconciled the diverse interests of "self-loving" men with the need for cooperation in satisfying the wants of the community. It is the general relevance of this system of thought, and the power of its analytical tools, that we wish to appraise. To do this we need not dwell on the technical content of the theory, much

less try to do justice to its elegance. A brief review of its main presuppositions and achievements will serve our purpose.

Traditional economic doctrine holds that man is by nature a rational being, capable of systematic choice. He has virtually limitless wants for the products of the resources available to him. One of his chief motivations is satisfaction of these wants, and his tastes enable him to establish a ranking of wants by their urgency. The resources at his disposal—natural, capital and human—are at a given time limited, and their use in combination is subject to technological limitations. Man's institutions are appraised as they contribute to the registering of his choices for the use of resources and the channeling of resources into their most effective use. The principal institution implementing the economizing process is the price system and its component competitive markets. The criterion of "effective use" of resources is derived from a basic value postulate: the goal of community economizing is maximum consumer want satisfaction. Resources are said to be inefficiently used if a reallocation of them would allow greater want satisfaction from the same resources.

The accomplishments of the system of thought developed from these assumptions—and of the economy it seeks to interpret—are impressive. It delineates an orderly, automatic solution to the complex questions that make up the economizing problem. What things shall our resources be used to produce and in what proportions? What specific combinations of resources shall produce these things? How shall the products be distributed among the community's members? The system's solution of the economizing problem is complete and optimal in the sense that, given the tastes, resources and technology of the community, a highly competitive market structure, and general satisfaction with the distribution of income, no reallocation of resources could produce a higher level of want satisfaction.

All this is accomplished consistently with individual freedom (which is at least an implicit value in the system). In the main, decision-making is decentralized and freedom is limited largely only by the market

itself. At the same time, in ethical terms, decision-making is reduced to the simplest possible level. A faith that somehow the pursuit of self-interest leads, within a frame of law appropriate to the system, to the benefit of society means that a built-in social ethics seemed to be provided. This latter is a more dubious accomplishment of the system, and was never proclaimed in these terms by Smith or his more sophisticated successors.

Finally, the scheme provided a set of policy indicators, for the logical requirements of the system had only to be translated into rules and institutions.

Along with its accomplishments, the system had some inherent weaknesses. The distribution of income resulting, first tied to "natural law" and after J. S. Mill to "productivity," has always been a target for criticism. Marx emerged from the classical line with an exploitation theory that sounded the call to revolution. The later linkage of productivity and income provided a basis for distribution that could be in some sense defended on grounds of justice. But the fact remains that distribution in the system is quite arbitrary (ultimately resting on consumer taste) in terms other than the system's own. This, in a land where justice is of considerable popular concern, has been an open invitation to alter the system's distributive results. Tax laws and other public policy, as well private efforts, like those of labor organizations, have been directed to this end. At some point, these redistributive attempts affect the allocation of resources and the "optimum" that can be realized. It is not clear, always, at what point this happens, nor that the effects are necessarily deleterious.

Another point of vulnerability has been that the self-regulating market economy requires the individual to operate in an environment where he has minimum power to control his environment. The requirement of perfect competition is that the individual have no effect on the terms of trade in the market. At the same time, during the period when the system was being projected into reality, social concern for the plight of the individual seemed to be receding. The

opportunity to pursue one's self-interest seemed to imply the responsibility to look after one's own interests. Such demands on the individual might be expected to produce subversion of the system. A revolt against impotence and the uncertainties of an impersonal and fickle market for resources and products prompted industrial combination, implicit collusion and soliciting of government intervention in ways inconsistent with the competitive scheme. Tariffs, fair trade laws, price supports, minimum wage laws, etc., have continued to flourish or have been reborn despite 175 years of first-rate argument on behalf of "unimpeded trade." Perhaps the most bitterly contested of all inroads was the emergence of a labor movement, the explicit purpose of which was to remove labor from the caprices of the market for its services, which often was competitive only on one side.

Even while Smith was sketching the initial outlines of the grand blueprint, the technological seeds of its disruption were being sowed. The industrial revolution, with its large-scale, heavy, expensive machinery eventually became an ally of other forces making for the emergence of a few dominant firms in major industrial fields. Moreover, the type of competition envisioned by the analysis has been and is being undercut by an accelerated rate of technical invention and innovation. Where the door is always open to new products and processes, much of the economic energy required for the "filling in" process of traditional static competition—imitation of the innovators—is absorbed by what might be termed a competition of progress.

Modern industrial capitalism as it has emerged from these cross-currents in many respects bears scant resemblance to the competitive blueprint of traditional economic thought. Structures of private power dominate much of the scene. Industrial giants, mass production and continuing mergers are the order of the day. Massive and powerful labor unions conduct large-scale collective bargaining with powerful employers the results of which have implications, in many directions, for far more people than those nominally represented at the bargain-

ing table. Pressure groups ubiquitously press, and often realize, their claims for special attention and favor by governments.

The implications of this picture for traditional economic analysis and for those who seek its guidance in questions of policy are important. To begin with, the economy as it exists reveals large areas that stand stripped of any properties allowing simple decision as to right conduct. Where private power can affect market terms and conditions, private responsibility (in the absence of extensive government regulation) cannot be long avoided.

More to the point here, it is clear that in important respects economic ideology has succeeded neither in inspiring institutional developments on its own terms nor in keeping up with institutional developments. For example, one of the pressing needs of economic analysis is for a theory of market behavior which embraces markets where a few sellers, rather than many, compete and which establishes criteria for the organizational efficiency of such markets. Included in such a theory should be a wider, more dynamic concept of competition, one that adds the dimension of progress to the static criteria of optimal resource allocation. Until some such extension of analysis occurs, "anti-trust" policy will be left much of the time on uncertain economic ground.

Recognition of serious gaps in present analysis, and areas of its inapplicability, should not, however, result in oversight of the contributions that it can make to important policy questions. There is less danger that this will happen in the area of the relatively new income analysis than in that of traditional allocative and distributive theory. The layman whose predisposition to government policy is at all friendly doubtless has some appreciation of the role that government fiscal and monetary policy can play in the achievement of over-all income stabilization. In fact, he sometimes seems more sanguine than economists regarding their potential effectiveness. The pervasive and dramatic effects of severe depression and inflation, at which income analysis was aimed, probably account for this awareness. After all, avoiding depres-

sion is still the outstanding economic concern of a large group of people today. Problems other than national income stability, however, are on the national agenda, and some of these may affect us little less, though more subtly, than booms and recessions. One such problem is the farm income problem.

Farm operators as a group have persistently been at or near the bottom of the American income scale in recent years. While it has been true that farm incomes have been particularly hard hit by severe depression, the problem is much wider than the effect of fluctuations of general business conditions on the farmer. For more than three decades farmers have sought "equality for agriculture" based on "parity prices." The claim has been that prices received for farm products have shown a marked tendency to decline, since the period 1910-1914, relative to prices farmers must pay for the things they buy. The difficulties in which farmers found themselves in the twenties were real enough. World War I had the double effect of temporarily increasing the demand for U.S. farm products, and of aiding the emergence of the United States as a creditor nation. Thus after the war there was a dual reason for a sharp drop in exports of farm output: as peace returned, so did Europe's former sources of agricultural supply, and the traditional means of financing the sizable export American farmers had enjoyed before the war (interest on the U.S. debt to foreigners) suddenly was no longer available. In the bargain, a high U.S. tariff policy prevented foreigners from procuring means of payment via exports to America. The result was that an agriculture geared to substantial export found its markets melting away.

Since 1929 has come a succession of farm measures, first to provide temporary loans on crops, later direct and indirect production controls, and finally a "loan" scheme in which the government in effect purchased "surplus" farm crops. In the main, these schemes have been explicitly aimed at supporting farm incomes by supporting farm prices. Twice when the storage problem became acute international disorder ex-

panded the market for U.S. agriculture and eased the pressure. But each time the pressure returned. At present, a Federal administration pledged to "getting government out of business" finds itself imposing the severest crop-restriction program yet employed to ease the pressure of accumulated "surpluses."

The history of industrial nations indicates that as they develop a smaller proportion of their resources is devoted to agriculture. This is partly due to the mechanics of comparative advantage—it is to their advantage to specialize in fabrication and buy farm products from less developed countries. But the shift would likely be true in a closed economy, with diversified resources such as those of the United States. Food, being a basic requirement, may be very important at the outset of development. But as productivity rises other products are likely to gain in relative importance. A higher standard of living does not connote merely more and better food, or even mainly this.

The job of the price mechanism, as the economist sees it, is to guide production as well as to distribute income. It is a device by which the changing tastes of consumers are reflected in their demands for products, and to which resource owners respond by shifting resources around in accordance with those demands. Price-fixing, thus, tends to distort the pattern of resource allocation from that indicated as desirable by consumers, since it prevents consumers' signals from filtering through to resource owners.

Traditional economic analysis readily shows that the symptoms of agriculture's distress are those of an industry in which allocative readjustment is required. If the lowest income farmers were to move to higher paid urban jobs they would benefit not only themselves but the mass of consumers as well, since production of goods which consumers value higher than agricultural products would thus be increased.

The problem is more complex than this, however. Between 1929 and 1952 the number of persons engaged in farming is estimated to have declined 25 percent. This indicates that there has been mobility. But the continued presence of "surpluses" indi-

cates that the rate of departure is not high enough to counterbalance the great increase in man-hour productivity, due to technological and capital improvements, within agriculture itself. Indeed, since 1929, farm worker productivity has increased at about five-thirds the rate of non-farm worker productivity. The trouble is that these productivity increases have been mainly realized on the large commercial farms, while the large group of subsistence farmers remain near their former poverty-stricken level. Thus, even with a "dynamic" increase in productivity within agriculture, the low productivity of this sizable but peripheral group remains as a signal that reallocation is required.

A system of price supports for farm products has the effect of impeding the flow of resources—i.e., human resources—from this sector to others in the economy where productivity and incomes are higher. But while present policy contributes in some degree to the immobility of the marginal farmer, it affords little real relief to them since so little of their product is marketed. On the other hand, the big commercial farmers, who little (or not at all) need income support, receive the lion's share of "relief." Further, the proportion of goods produced within agriculture is likely to become distorted over time by parity prices. Just as relative consumer demands may shift between farm and non-farm products, so they may shift among farm products themselves. Moreover, if crop restrictions are added it will be likely that some land remaining in cultivation will be inferior to some that is removed, since acreage allotments are on the basis of farm units. So our policy may produce inefficient use of our land resources as well.

It is a mark of how far from the heart of the problem that present policy strikes to note that the low mobility of the subsistence farmer can be traced less to price supports than to the lack of real (to him) alternatives. Sometimes jobs elsewhere have not existed, particularly in years of depression or recession. More often, the lack has been knowledge of opportunities, financial ability to move, education or job training. Govern-

ment policy can be aimed specifically at each of these difficulties, and certainly at less long-run cost than an indefinite extension of the present program of subsidies and high food prices.

All this is not to say that present agricultural policy is necessarily wrong. This is a value judgment for the community to make. But if the basis of community judgment is at all similar to the presuppositions of economic theory, present policy must appear as of dubious worth. In any case, the point that is here underscored is that reference to economic analysis may reveal many effects of a policy that remain obscure without benefit of a systematic way of looking at things.

Brief reference may be made to other problems having similar elements. The case for free international trade is as old as economics, and has developed into a strong one. In sum, economic theory makes the same claims for free international allocation of resources, and thus for free trade, as it does for domestic allocation and trade. The real income of the whole community of nations can be increased by encouraging each country to employ itself in lines in which it has a comparative advantage. As in the case of all economic problems, there are dynamic elements that confuse the picture. The "infant industry," it is said, if protected at the outset may be expected to stand alone once a bit matured and thus justify its early protection. Where national boundaries are involved, there is always the possibility that they may sometime become economically important in the event of international dispute. Thus the national interest, it may be argued, often requires protection of industries vital to defense. Furthermore, breaking down trade barriers may have the effect of redistributing income away from some previously well-situated group leaving it less well off than before.

Strong as the case for free trade is, it cannot show that a country would in all cases be better off with no tariffs than with some tariffs. Further, it cannot prove that no particular group would be worse off if trade were made unhampered. But what this amounts to is really little more than an ex-

tension of the uncertainties of the distributive results of free competition which we noted earlier.

While a blanket indictment of tariffs and other restrictions of international trade cannot be handed down, it must be said that protectionism, like farm price supports, is often little but an attempt to preserve the *status quo*—a protection of domestic inertia. Changing international productivity conditions may be indicated by the decline of a once prosperous domestic industry. The policy response to this situation may either be the raising of tariffs, or an attempt to ease the difficulties of resource exit from that industry to more favored areas and allow consumers the benefit of a lower price on the industry's product. Economic theory cannot answer the question of which is the "right" policy. But it certainly can shed some light on the respective consequences of the alternatives.

In present times an additional caution sign must be raised in the face of nationalist economic policy. A nation vested with "free world" leadership which continues to exhibit protectionist tendencies may be behaving in a manner irresponsible not only to its own economic interests, but to its political interests as well, and to those of allies.

Problems of over-all national income stabilization have their allocative aspects, too. For instance, a program to implement the 1946 Employment Act might gear public works of the Federal government to the level of unemployment in a given area; that is, when unemployment became, say, 5 percent of the labor force in that area, previously planned government projects would be started in the area. But a check with neo-classical theory would soon point up the need to refine the criterion to include only cyclical unemployment, rather than also including possible structural unemployment due to the presence of declining industries in the area. To saddle a counter-cyclical program problems arising from productivity changes or changes in consumer taste would be doubly disadvantageous. It would impair the program's cycle-combating effectiveness by draining its resources, and at the same time obstruct necessary and

desirable (from the economic viewpoint) structural changes in the economy.

In economic problems involving distributive questions, there is always an element of justice. The problems discussed above may provide some illustration of the tension that exists between what might be called "intuitive" and "systematic" responses to questions of justice. Changes in productivity or consumer tastes, in a market economy, are quickly reflected in pressures on certain resources. If these are not mobile—that is, for some reason there is no exit from the industry in question—then "hardship" will persist in the affected area. Public policy orientation often seems to be "intuitive" in the sense that its response is a direct attempt to rectify the situation through price-setting. This does not necessarily lead to bad policy (policy inconsistent with high-level objectives), but it very well may. Economic analysis indicates how gains in welfare may be systematically diffused throughout the economy via a competitive market process. In a given case, policymakers might conclude that such a distribution is institutionally impossible (the theory does not apply), or undesirable. But a reference to theory will at least increase the possibility that *what is given up* in selecting one method is understood.

Appraising the interpretive and prescriptive contributions of traditional economic thought, one must admit that they are modest judged by the needs for them. Yet, despite its shortcomings, economic theory as it stands provides valuable insights into the workings of the economy and the efficacy of policy. Its view of man—at least that part of him which actuates the economy—seems realistic for the purposes to which it is put. The flow of resources in the economy is not haphazard, but tends in the direction of their most profitable use—i.e., following consumer choices. Competitive forces are working to increase real income, and thus human want satisfaction. If *laissez-faire* has proved undesirable, still a preponderant role remains to private initiative as the motive force in our own economy. Whatever inadequacy exists in the theory is prob-

(continued on page 28)

Signs of Health and Disease in the Political Community

CHARLES D. KEAN

The domestic scene as a whole is made up of so many strands, many of which appear to contradict each other, that any theological analysis has to deal with general trends if it is not going to be misleading. In any event, the prevailing cultural climate must be considered as the background against which even major developments are described.

This analysis is written at approximately the end of the first half of the Eisenhower administration. The 83rd Congress has written its record such as it is. The center of public attention seems to be shifting naturally from world events and general domestic conditions to the kind of confused yet heightened political concern which is normal in an election year in the United States, but since this is not the occasion of a presidential choice the lines are not as sharply drawn as they might be. Rather, political concern is composed of a potpourri of personalities, traditional loyalties and real and imagined issues.

Any consideration of the domestic situation should at the same time be concerned with the world picture. The current climate might be described as one of general non-appreciation of rather than isolation from the total world. There is general intellectual recognition that the communist problem is world-wide in both fact and implication, but there is little if any real connection, as people feel it, between the problem of internal security and what went on at Geneva in June and at Manila in September.

Americans don't want a Third World War; who does? The general reaction to Syngman Rhee's address to the Congress and to the intervention-in-Asia opinions ascribed to certain generals and admirals seems not so much to reflect any considered alternative policy to which the public mind subscribes as it does a fear of playing-with-matches. In other words, there is little ap-

preciation of the interrelationship of domestic and international matters.

The United States remains committed to the United Nations without too clear an appreciation of what for. On the one hand there is a basic residual loyalty to an idealistic tradition of international co-operation for peace and justice which must not be written off. On the other hand, Senator Knowland is not alone in the opinion that our national responsibilities to other peoples may be disregarded at any time that they appear to run counter to special national interests. Perhaps not everybody who feels this way would limit or revise our participation for the same reasons, but there are many who seem to take lightly the fact that opportunity and responsibility usually go together.

There is a general sense of relief that the anticipated business recession has not turned out to be, at least as yet, what many feared. While many symptoms of economic instability can be discerned, people are simply not as worried as they were last spring. This does not mean that any greater understanding exists, because it does not; nor does it mean that any basic corrective measures have been taken, because they have not been—but rather that people want to ignore storm warnings unless the wind actually begins to blow hard and rain begins to fall.

The administration-sponsored invasion by private enterprise of the public domain, in the atomic power project and the assignment of patent rights, has not aroused the interest it might have. It is true that these measures, when before the Senate, provided the clearest example of the facing of a real issue that the 83rd Congress considered, even though the resistance largely came from the Senators representing the T.V.A. area. In any event there did not seem to be widespread appreciation of the basic issues

involved, and neither did there seem to be too great a concern about the matter. Even the Senate seemed more interested in its time-table than in its responsibility in defining national policy.

The internal security issue has been given a dramatic highlight in the Army-McCarthy hearings, where despite the confusion as to what was going on and why, some issues were clarified even though not really capitalized upon. An opportunity has been given, which has not yet gone by, to reinterpret in our time not only the legal differentiation in function between the three main branches of government but also why such a differentiation and balance is necessary in a free society.

At the same time, perhaps some of the edge has been taken off anti-communist hysteria. It is generally conceded that everybody who is anybody is anti-communist, whatever that means. People feel bound to underline that fact about themselves and their policies even when it is hardly germane. The anti-communist bill, rushed through in the closing hours of the Congress, seems more to have been a means of getting everybody on record as in favor of good and against evil than actually doing anything very constructive—and as is usually the case in such legislation, new problems, particularly in the field of labor relations, have been created largely by oversight.

The 83rd Congress is congratulated by the President for two major pieces of economic legislation: the tax revision law and the farm subsidy revision. The first is a good example of the fact that it is never possible to meet a real issue solely through systematic regulation, because other aspects are reflected both in the thinking of those who act and in the results of their action. Recodification of the tax laws was doubtless needed, but taxation can never be regarded simply as a matter of rationalizing government financing. It always has an effect upon the general economic welfare, and the tax revision law is no exception. In other words, one cannot separate the Administration's desire to do a necessary job of systematization from the fact that any administration would be bound to reflect its own economic

background in doing the job. The present law is sponsored by a Republican administration and necessarily reflects the Republican tradition in economic policy. Something parallel might be said about the farm subsidy revision, where despite the fact that something was needed in the way of flexible price supports, it cannot be stated that the result was simply a matter of economic objectivity.

Behind what has been said is a cultural condition which, particularly in this country, both conditions what is done and the climate in which it is received. There are two basic illusions in Western culture which have tragic results in the long run, even though in specific instances they may very well contribute to short-range accomplishments. These are: 1) the belief that all problems are ultimately soluble, so that compromises may be regarded as at least slight steps in the right direction; and 2) the conviction that it is possible to be unequivocally right in making concrete choices.

A good many forces have contributed over the years to the development of these two illusions, particularly the interaction of admitted technological advance with the currents of political and economic history. These two illusions are to be found wherever western culture predominates. They are not peculiarly American by any means, but they have their particular American manifestations.

These two illusions are rooted in the givenness of history—since history presents man with problems with which he must deal and choices which involve reflection both beforehand and after-the-fact. Both the technical and moral dimensions of action are of the nature of historical necessity, but it is one thing to recognize the existence of the dimensions and quite another to be committed to a theoretical optimism about them.

The belief that all problems are finally soluble is the world's rebuttal to the Christian doctrines of Creation and Redemption. In the last analysis it forces man to be his own God and to feel an inerradicable anxiety when he is unable to carry off the God-role. At the same time it gives an ex-

aggerated cosmic significance to relative achievements—in areas where there has been actual accomplishment, such as, for example, the development of antibiotics in medicine or electronics in industry. The result tends to be that Western man is conditioned to wear a hard veneer of confidence, while underneath the exterior is an unanswerable anxiety since his technical achievements do not really bring the New Jerusalem any nearer, and in his heart he knows it.

The conviction that it is possible to be unequivocally right in making concrete choices is the world's rebuttal to the Christian Doctrines of Justification by Faith in Christ Jesus and Sanctification through the Holy Spirit, with their concomitant reality of Original Sin. For the word, sin, is substituted the word, wrong, a term which short-cuts man's moral dynamic. The problem takes the form of seeking or imagining an unqualified rightness in pragmatic choices, and since this goal is very difficult to attain, rightness tends to be defined by its opposite, wrongness—the way to be right is not be wrong. (For example, the way to be politically and economically right is to be opposed to communism, defined as wrong.) The result tends to be that western man on the one hand can cling to the adage—"He profits most who serves the best" (stated in a more sophisticated way very often)—and at the same time find himself facing a problem of guilt which is never fully handled by projecting it on external evil.

The effect of these two illusions is to confuse not so much the factual content of issues as to distort their essential meaning. This is most striking in the area of expectation. The result of confusion here is that issues are seen in only two dimensions—those of time and space. They have no eschatological dimension to speak of, and, therefore, actions are not recognized as subject to any existential judgment. At the same time, however, the criteria of success and failure, which certainly have relative significance, become so exaggerated as to distort seriously man's own understanding of what is happening to him. Yet, since the cultural spirit of our time is not actually the unqualified pragmatism that it some-

times is made out to be, expectation is always marked by an ambiguity—with the test of what works, on the one hand, being in tension with an abstract moralism on the other; and attempts to synthesize the two—so as to make moral fulfillment and success identical never are quite convincing even to those who try.

The confusion in the area of expectation might perhaps be more clearly seen by looking at American foreign policy today, but the same thing applies to the domestic. Anti-communism is neither sufficiently sharp nor sufficiently abstract to serve as the major aspect of the moral side of expectation, although there have been serious attempts to make it precisely this on the domestic scene. When everybody is in favor of good and against evil, the symbols used for good have to be transcended in order for man to find any fulfillment in historical action. The traditional American ethical canons of frugality, energy, perseverance and generosity still have their appeal, but perhaps there is a parable in the continual radio appeal: "Send your contribution to (whatever of a large number of things) in care of your Postmaster." There is no doubt a considerable element of self-righteousness behind the atomic energy law revision—free enterprise and private initiative made not only self-authenticating, but also the authentication of practical policy.

The other side of the same confusion is the general absence of a sense of history, which means that there is considerable serious distortion as to the way issues are related to each other. The modern world, because of its scientific tradition, tends to see events related to each other in a causal sequence, but such a view provides not so much a dynamic relationship between events as it does a chronological one. Without an adequate sense of history, neither the glory nor the tragedy of human nature can be seen as a significant aspect of daily experience, whether on the individual or the group level.

It is obvious that people in this country do not really take into account when reading the newspaper on one day what happened in the same areas on the previous day.

The tone of general reactions to developments both in the foreign and domestic field bear this out, and certainly the record of the public relations of the Junior Senator from Wisconsin is a major illustration. Part of the problem may be ascribed to the volume, complexity and stridency of the news itself, and part to the fact that the emotional strength of some issues tend either to distort other issues or to obliterate them from public consciousness. But this is not a sufficient explanation. A more serious aspect of the problem is the absence of a real sense of history which would permit people to relate the elements of experience to each other within the context of ongoing meaning.

Without an adequate sense of history, events become isolated from each other except for a vague intellectual recognition of the factors of cause and effect. One may, for example, explain why a child was hit by an automobile by describing the causal pattern in great detail, yet while such an analysis may be somewhat helpful in the study of traffic control and as a teaching device for other children about taking care when crossing streets, the real significance of the event is not even dealt with. On the national area, the absence of an adequate sense of history leads people to approach real problems on the basis of the success or failure of policies and programs. While there is recognition of the fact that few if any actions ever dispose of a problem completely, the practical application of this awareness does not really modify one's basic confidence but rather suggests that some steps are not quite as long as they might have been. But as a matter of fact, the Supreme Court decision on segregation in the public schools, important as it was and acclaimed as it ought to have been, is neither the end of the world as it appears in some quarters nor yet the descent of "the new Jerusalem" as it is regarded in other areas. Rather the Supreme Court decision took place within history where sinful man deals with concrete issues under judgment and grace.

In practical terms, these two confusions—the flat nature of expectation and the ab-

sence of an adequate sense of history—mean that the approach to concrete issues tends to take the form solely of a four-sided pattern: 1, what can work; 2, what standards of moral judgment apply; 3, what is the causal pattern of the situation at hand; and 4, what are the probable problems which will eventuate through the proposed solution. Now there is nothing wrong with these questions in themselves. They are all real questions and would have to be dealt with in some manner in any real decision. But without a depth dimension, man's own will becomes the final determining force in what he does. On the political level this means that power in itself tends to become the decisive factor—since power represents the predominance of organized will over alternative desires. Power, of course, is necessarily involved in all political action, but power needs a context in which the purposes and results of its exercise can be appreciated. It would be inaccurate to say that political decisions on the domestic scene in America are the result simply of naked power, but it seems to be true that the context is so confused that the exercise of power in dealing with political issues cannot be sufficiently evaluated. Without a depth dimension the meaning of what happens cannot be understood either transcendently or existentially.

There is a pervasive feeling that such a context for the exercise of political power is needed, and our modern American secular culture is often tempted to provide it by an appeal to something called "religion." The present Administration is particularly fond of using this context. This use of "religion" has admitted overtones of a Christian heritage, but in practice it turns out most often to be "religion qua religion" and therefore a religion without any real sense of sin, judgment, justification or redemption. This fact can be illustrated abundantly from the whole history of the internal security problem in this country, where "religion" undefined is made to be the antithesis of communism equally undefined and useful primarily because of its opposition to communism. There are cer-

(continued on page 24)

American Foreign Policy in the Light of Christian Realism

H. VANB. CLEVELAND

The character of international relations in our times reflects a tragic contrast. The forces of industrialism and technical advance have made nations so interdependent that, for the first time in history, the creation of a universal human community has become necessary and technically possible. Yet the emergence of this need and possibility has not led men to build a world community, living in peace under the universal reign of a just law. On the contrary, the arrival of the age of world-wide economic and military interdependence has been announced by the breakdown of the former international order, the intensification of nationalistic passions, the emergence of demonic imperialisms, the outbreak of two world wars of unparalleled scale, and the threat of a third of vastly greater destructiveness.

What is the meaning of this contrast? From a Christian standpoint its meaning is unmistakable and so is the obligation that flows from it.

I.

The fact that there is the need and the technical possibility of bringing economic life and military power under the control of an international order gives rise for Christians to a moral obligation to create such an order. The obligation is to hope and to work for the creation of an international order which does justice, as far as possible, to the claims and interests of all peoples. The meaning of the near-anarchy of international relations in the twentieth century is likewise apparent. It is the result of the failure of peoples to heed this obligation. The increasing closeness of nations to each other in this century has posed serious threats to their economic interests and their military security. But they have not usually responded to these threats creatively, by seeking new means of reconciling their claims and interests. Usu-

ally, they have reacted egotistically, by nationalistic measures to protect their economic interests or to provide unilaterally for their own security, with only occasional concern for the interests and security of other nations.

These things have been conspicuously true of the aggressive totalitarian powers, but they have been true also of the unaggressive Western democracies. The latter have generally made their own national interest the sole guiding principle of their foreign policies, apart from sporadic acts of international charity. Under the pressure of military insecurity or economic distress, they have tended to define that interest in increasingly narrow and uncompromising ways. Yet, because they have been unaggressive, the democracies have usually imagined themselves to be the innocent victims of aggression, entirely without responsibility for international conflict. Because they have identified their national interest with the preservation of the international status quo, with the defense of a crumbling international order based on national sovereignty, they have thought themselves guiltless of international disorder and war. They have assumed that the nation-state system was the final stage of political order and that a mysterious principle of harmony would assure that the pursuit by each nation of its own interests would secure international peace.

In these beliefs the Western democracies have been doubly wrong. First, in taking as the norm of international justice the nation-state system and the existing distribution of wealth and power among nations, they failed to do justice to claims for status, power and economic opportunity by peoples who had not shared in the technical progress of the 19th Century. Second, in accepting the nation-state system as final, they failed to appreciate the tendency to

conflict and war implicit in national sovereignty and the principle of national interest. They mistook for a natural or rational harmony the fortunate results of the *Pax Britannica* and the consequences of the moral and historical restraints on national sovereignty which operated in the last century. They were, in consequence, unprepared, intellectually and morally, to cope with the anarchic forces of national egotism released in this century from these traditional bonds.

The totalitarian powers have seen far more clearly than the conservative democracies the injustices and obsolescence of the nation-state system because their radical ambitions were frustrated by it. Yet they are more guilty than the democracies. Though they have gone beyond the national interest principle and have attempted to create supranational political order, the kind of order they have sought to impose is worse than the disorder which it would replace. It is a tyrannical dominion over other peoples, devoid of justice and freedom, marked by calculated cruelty and oppression of subject peoples. The response of the totalitarian powers to military insecurity or economic frustration has been an imperialism in which a lust for power has been freed of moral and constitutional restraints. In the case of Soviet Russia, this power lust is unfortunately intensified and given great staying power by a demonic political religion which justifies any means, however evil, as necessary to the building of an impossible earthly paradise.

The meaning of this experience is that a just international order cannot any longer be built on the principle of national interest and the practice of absolute national sovereignty any more than on the basis of totalitarian imperialism. Peace with justice in an interdependent world requires new norms which can do justice to peoples who have been less favored by history than the Western democracies. It requires new supranational structures which can bring economic life and military power under the control of those norms.

But the task of obtaining agreement on such norms and of establishing such structures is formidably difficult. For many years

thoughtful persons have argued the necessity of bringing economics and military power under the rule of a just international order. They have predicted world wars and new tyrannical empires if the forces of industrialism and technology were not brought under voluntary international control. But their analyses have had but little influence on national attitudes and policies. For reason can perceive the need and the possibility of a just international order but reason alone is powerless to create it. The acceptance of a new international order depends upon something more than a recognition that nations are interdependent. It requires the growth of mutual trust, respect and forbearance among nations. It requires the growth of community among peoples, and the only force which can create community is uniting love.

Central organizing power is also necessary to create international order in an interdependent world. Just as order in national communities depends on the power of national governments, so some kind of supranational organizing power is necessary to create order among nations. Likewise, an international order—like a national state—requires power to protect itself from nations which remain outside it and would weaken or destroy it to serve their own ends. Lasting order without the support and protection of power is not a possibility of human history. Community within nations or among them will never be so perfect that the need for political power will disappear and its structures “wither away.”

The Christian obligation to work for a just international order thus involves a realistic acceptance of the dependence of that order on organizing and protective power. It involves also a duty to make the exercise of that power as just as circumstances permit. That is, the power ought to be constitutional, not tyrannical. It ought to be based as far as possible on the consent of the nations subject to it. It should be limited, and the nations subject to it should be armed with legal and political means to enforce its limits. The duty to be just applies not only among the nations which participate in a scheme of international

order but also toward those nations which remain outside it—even to those who may seek to destroy it. In the case of such non-participating nations, however, the scope of that duty is greatly limited by the necessity of protecting the order from the consequences of the outsiders' hostility or indifference.

The forms which such supranational organizing and protecting power might take are various and unpredictable. Yet it is safe to say that it would more likely take the form of an organized hegemony of the strongest nation or group of nations than of a federal union of nations.

The possibility of creating a just international order in our times is subject to rather narrow historical limits. A supranational center of power cannot be established simply by agreement among nations, regardless of the diversity of their cultures and historical backgrounds and of their present political aims. For power and law are not mere artifacts of reason or simple products of altruism. They must have roots in history. They must in some degree grow out of a pre-existing international community which, though it may be divided by national loyalties and antagonisms, already shares a sense of its own unity and is already imbued with the social attitudes and political values necessary to the conduct of constitutional government. The ability of nations to transcend their own immediate interests and to create international community is too limited to be effective except in the most favorable historical circumstances.

For these reasons, a universal international order under a world government is not an historic possibility for our times—unless it takes the form of the tyrannical rule of one nation or group of nations over all the others. Only within the group of nations which calls itself the Western community do there now exist the historical prerequisites of an international order which could be both effective and relatively just. Within the rest of the free world, and between it and the Western community, the diversity of backgrounds and the strength of national antagonisms probably limit the

possibilities of international order for the foreseeable future to much less intimate and binding forms of international cooperation. And between the communist and free worlds, the best that can now be hoped for is a dangerous "co-existence," which (in Trotsky's phrase) is neither peace nor war, until communism and the Communist empire have been sufficiently weakened by internal corruption to undergo a radical transformation.

It remains, nevertheless, our duty to hope and to work for a universal human community, embracing all peoples, living in peace under just law, even though this ideal now appears remote. The United Nations is both a living symbol of that ideal and evidence of its remoteness. The UN's universal membership (in principle), the juridical equality of its members, and the words of its Charter symbolize concretely man's hope for such a world order. Yet the UN as a working international organization gives daily evidence of the deep divisions among the nations which prevent the realization of that hope. It shows why effective international order requires organizing power able to decide and to act without unanimous consent. It shows why the process of building international order must today take place, for the most part, among smaller groups of like-minded nations.

II.

What do these general considerations imply for the conduct of American foreign policy today? This paper will conclude with a few observations on this question.

Protecting the Free World

The relations of the United States and the free world with the communist countries are largely determined by the fact that these countries are in the grip of a fanatical political religion which makes them seek to solve the problem of international order by imposing a world-wide communist imperialism. Unavoidably, therefore, American relations with the communist world take the form of an acute power struggle.

The United States is justified in resisting—by force where necessary—the further expansion of communist power, not simply

as a matter of self-defense but because the success of the communist design would make impossible—perhaps for a long period—the progress of justice in the international community. It would bring about a tragic retrogression in human values on a worldwide scale. This does not mean that the United States is justified in using any means to defeat communism. Even in this relationship, dominated as it is by hostility and profound distrust, we have moral obligations—for example, to avoid aggressive warfare and to rely, in general, on a defensive policy. We are under the obligation to avoid attitudes of hatred and vindictive self-righteousness toward Communists at home and abroad, however strongly we must resist the attempts of their leaders to impose their beliefs and rule beyond their present borders. We are required to believe that the communist tyranny, like all tyrannies before it, will in time fall of its own sin. We are required to try to live with it without total war, if we can, until that occurs.

The necessity and moral duty to protect the free world from communism involves us unavoidably in an arms race with the communist powers—a race whose duration is indefinite and whose outcome is incalculable. We dare not fail to try to keep up with and ahead of the Soviet Union in the latest weapons of war—horrible as their use would be—lest we allow the Communists to achieve a preponderance of military power which would enable them to carry out their design by intimidation.

But this does not mean that we can rely chiefly on military power—particularly on our power to fight a general war—to protect the free world. In the years immediately following World War II, the American monopoly of atomic weapons served to deter major communist aggression. But, since then, the military situation has changed radically in favor of the communist bloc; they too now possess nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them. This radical shift in the balance of power means that the United States can no longer use the implied threat of atomic bombardment to deter local communist advances. In effect, the Soviet possession of nuclear weapons

neutralizes the diplomatic power which our atomic superiority formerly gave us. The atomic arms race has reached a stalemate as far as its diplomatic effects are concerned. Henceforth, the power struggle between the two worlds will be conducted by political, psychological, economic and local military means, with the Communists somewhat freer than before to utilize their great resources in these categories.

Unfortunately, this implication of the new situation created by the Soviet possession of nuclear weapons has not yet been generally accepted in the free world. In fact, American foreign policy has reacted perversely. Our growing sense of insecurity has found expression in blustering threats of atomic war—"massive retaliation"—at the very moment when that threat has become ineffective as a diplomatic weapon. We have seemingly abandoned the policy of resisting forcible communist expansion by force at the very time when the risks to the Communists of undertaking such military adventures have been reduced. We have been cutting down on the positive measures of our foreign policy—such as foreign economic and military aid, Point IV and economic cooperation with other countries, designed to strengthen free countries and develop unity among them—at a time when the dependence of our own security on the success of such measures is increasing. At a time when the external menace of communism is growing, we have been distracted in our attempts to cope with it by a paranoid search for domestic traitors. Though our survival depends as never before on unity with other free countries, we have been drifting toward isolationism.

These perverse American responses to the free world's security have their counterparts in other countries of the free world: the growth of neutralism, defeatism, pacifism and unrealistic interpretations of Soviet and American policy. And these reactions are, of course, re-enforced by—and, in turn, re-enforce—American isolationist trends. The Communists, since Stalin's death, have successfully shifted their tactics to take advantage of and re-enforce these divisive forces within the free world.

Isolationism at home and neutralism abroad are not merely the consequences of failure to understand that the survival of free countries is jeopardized by their disunity. Isolationism and neutralism are more the consequences of moral and spiritual failings than of intellectual errors. Their baffling perversity is the product of national egotism and of the distrust among free countries which results from that egotism. The notion that the United States could be made into an impregnable fortress, or the hope that Europe could stay out of a war between America and Russia, are patently inconsistent with the facts of geography and the character of modern weapons. Yet these irrational ideas have appeal because they rationalize a growing distrust between Europe and America. It is, therefore, not possible to overcome isolationism and neutralism merely by appeals to national self-interest, however rationally persuasive. For these attitudes are, in their vital core, spiritual phenomena, impervious to rational argument. To overcome them is therefore, in part, a moral and spiritual problem. A growing sense of community among nations is the only fully effective antidote to isolationism and neutralism. And community among nations can grow only as their sense of mutual responsibility and their devotion to the ideal of a just international order grow.

If American foreign policy in recent years has failed to reflect adequately our interest in the unity of the free world, it is not because Americans have been too little concerned for their own security. We have, indeed, been very much concerned about our security, but that concern has expressed itself in perverse ways. Paradoxically, the only way in which our foreign policy can be made more effective in promoting our security—and the only way in which Americans can be motivated sufficiently to support an adequate foreign policy—is to overcome our present excessive concern with security and devote ourselves wholeheartedly to the positive tasks of foreign policy. In short, our national interest can be protected only if we are able to transcend it.

Concretely, this means that our foreign

policy should again be infused with something of the spirit of concern for other peoples which was in the Marshall Plan and the Point IV program. These creative policies were effective in building international community because they had in them an element of genuine altruism. It was this element which brought so positive and vigorous a response in Europe to the Marshall Plan. It was this element too which accounted in considerable part for the breadth and vigor of the support these policies received from the American people. It is no longer easy to recapture that spirit, for relations with our foreign friends and allies have deteriorated seriously, and the characteristically generous spirit of Americans in their foreign relations has been weakened by bitter domestic strife. But it has to be done. A basic change in the inner spirit and outward tone of our foreign policy is not only a duty but a necessity of our survival.

Organizing the Western Community

The Western nations form an international community in an historical and moral, though not yet in a political, sense. For they share the history of Western civilization. They share the moral values and political ideals derived from classical culture and from the Judeo-Christian religious traditions. Though yet divided by nationalism, they derive from this common heritage an underlying sense of spiritual unity and a degree of mutual trust which are unique in this divided world. For these historical reasons, the achievement of a high degree of Western political and economic organization, supported by supranational power, is (as already observed) an historic possibility in our times and a duty for the West, difficult as it will be to achieve. It is also a necessity for the survival of Western civilization.

The goal of Western unity has, in fact, been implicit in American policy toward free Europe since the end of the war. Our policy has recognized, in various ways, that the West could not survive in the face of Soviet power, nor prosper economically, as

an unorganized congeries of nationalistic atoms. The principal creative acts of our European policy—the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, and our stimulation of European unification—have been based on that goal and that premise.

The efforts to unify the West have envisaged a tight, supranational union of western continental Europe, joined more loosely with Britain and the United States in an Atlantic community. This concept is not, to be sure, the ideal political structure of western unity; a supranational Atlantic union of some kind should be, perhaps, the long-term goal. But it is a workable compromise between existing needs and possibilities. Specifically, the United States is not now willing to contemplate any merger of its sovereignty with that of other western nations, and Britain is almost equally reluctant to do so. The major continental nations, however, have been willing to move in this direction and, indeed, their military and economic requirements urgently demand a merger of their separate sovereignties. Moreover, unless merged into a union, they are not strong enough to play their just part in the Atlantic community; without union they may be pensioners or clients but not equal partners of Britain and the United States. Thus justice as well as military and economic necessity demand European union. At the same time, European union depends on the growing unity of the Atlantic community as a whole, for it needs the moral support of close military and economic cooperation, on a permanent basis, from Britain and America.

At first, the West made rapid progress in this direction. New Atlantic and European institutions were established. A new spirit of western and European unity and cooperation blossomed. But, over the last three years, this hopeful progress has come to a halt. Recently, disintegration has begun; the French rejection of the European Defense Community is dramatic evidence of it and of some of its causes.

This French action can be blamed in part on French egotism and blindness: too many Frenchmen are unable to grow beyond their hereditary hatred of Germany and their

attachment to the symbols of France's former greatness. Yet, much of the responsibility for this setback rests on the United States and Britain. There are not a few Frenchmen who oppose a continental European union for reasons more legitimate than hatred of Germany and nostalgia for the past. Some fear that a six-nation European union would be dominated by the Germans. Some fear that this union would be too weak to stand up to growing Soviet power. These fears could be allayed if Britain and the United States were willing to move closer to continental Europe—to make more binding military commitments to it, to give it more effective economic cooperation, and to guarantee that Germany would not be allowed to upset its internal political balance. But neither Britain nor the United States have been willing to do these things in sufficient degree. Britain has emphasized the priority of her Commonwealth ties over her European commitments. The United States has reduced its military commitments in Europe and its economic cooperation activities with European countries.

If, then, we are to reverse the disintegration of the West, we must act generously and wholeheartedly to meet the fears of our European partners. This means that we should increase our economic and military commitments in Europe, in order to give Europeans the sense of American support and Western solidarity which they need if they are to resume the task of European unification. We should accept a binding commitment to keep substantial military forces in Europe for as long as may be required. We should intensify our economic cooperation with Europe—for example, by cutting drastically our tariffs on European manufactures, by providing investment funds for the expansion of European industries, and in other ways. We should stop talking to and about Europe as though our only concern with Europe were to create a military obstacle to communist expansion. We should try to achieve a more courageous tone in our discussion of the free world's security problem, in order to convince our friends in Europe that we are not panic-stricken and irresponsible amateurs but

sober professionals in world affairs. We must, in sum, take the initiative to restore a feeling of mutual trust and respect and of growing mutual support between ourselves and our European allies.

Promoting Progress in Non-Western Countries

Most of the non-Western countries of the free world are undergoing a rapid and profound social transformation. Under the impact of ideas and economic forces from the West, tradition-bound agrarian societies in Asia and Latin America are in course of rapid change. New nations have arisen and are still arising. They are faced with insistent demands for economic reform, for economic development and for political change with their unproductive economic systems, their traditional social structures and their untried political institutions are unable to cope with. In many of these underdeveloped countries, all other social problems are intensified by an inordinate rate of population growth.

This revolutionary transformation contains great potentialities for good and for evil—for the underdeveloped countries themselves and for the West. As a matter of a moral duty and of Western self-interest, the West should therefore try to influence the course of this transformation—not to try to dominate it and force it into a Western mold, but to help it move in directions consistent with our ideals of political and economic justice and to render its outcome compatible, as far as we justly can, with the vital interests of the West.

Unfortunately, the extent to which the West can justly participate in promoting progress in non-Western countries is limited. For these countries are, for the most part, highly suspicious of Western intentions. In many cases, their national self-consciousness depends upon a strong anti-foreign orientation. The weakness of their domestic political and economic institutions and their frequently precarious national unity make them fear Western participation in their affairs, even when that participation is clearly motivated by a desire to promote their national development. Their weakness

in the face of Western strength, and their memories of colonial domination, make it impossible to develop between them and the West the kind of international cooperation and organization which is possible within the Western community. Nevertheless there is much the West can do to aid the underdeveloped countries, particularly to assist their economic development and to improve their public services.

The spirit in which this assistance is rendered is all-important. A purely political, anti-communist tone is to be avoided. By and large, the peoples of these countries do not fear communism. They are still largely blind to the threat of communism to their prized national independence. They fear foreign domination, but, for historical reasons, what they fear is domination by the West. Until fairly recently, the tone of American policy toward the underdeveloped countries has been good, although the amounts of our development assistance have been manifestly inadequate. Of late, however, the deteriorating tone of American foreign policy, already referred to, has also affected American foreign development activities. The Point IV program, for example, which had become for many the symbol of a relatively disinterested American concern for the peoples of underdeveloped lands, has been merged with military aid programs in such a way as to destroy its symbolic value.

What is now required is a shift in tone and motivation, accompanied by an increase in the amount of American and other Western resources devoted to the task of foreign economic development. Our foreign development policies should be based on the recognition that God's bounty has blessed Americans in many ways beyond human deserving. We should, therefore, be willing to set aside each year a small part of our vast resources for this purpose. Experience suggests that the amounts of American capital that can be effectively used for development of underdeveloped countries are not enormous. For this purpose alone, we ought to be contributing at least \$1-2 billion annually.

We cannot know whether Western aid to

the development of underdeveloped countries will help bring an outcome of the transformation through which they are now passing which will be favorable to Western interests or consistent with Western values. Nevertheless, we are obliged to assist them, for, our duty to aid is not dependent on the assurance of success.

* * *

In the task of bringing greater order and justice to the international community, the United States has a special responsibility—that of leadership. The preceding pages have suggested a little of what this responsibility may now entail for American foreign policy. It remains only to underline the essential spirit of what has been suggested.

America can fulfill its responsibility of leadership only if it deserves the trust and cooperation of other free countries and only if it can find the motivation to lead. These two conditions are in fact the same condition. To deserve to lead, we must be willing to transcend not only our immediate national interests but even our national ideals,

as we have traditionally defined them. We must be willing to extend our national ideal of freedom and plenty to include a widening community of nations. To find a sufficient motivation for foreign policy, we cannot rely merely on appeals to our national interest or to our national ideals, for, except at moments of major crisis, the public cannot grasp with real conviction why our national security is involved with Europe's economic health, or with Asia's economic development or with the fall of a small and distant country to the Communists. Yet many Americans will react positively to policies which symbolize America's creative role in extending the "American dream" to a wider community of nations.

Faith is required to do these things. To deserve the trust of other nations, our national conduct must express in some degree faith in the ultimate power of uniting love in history. To have the courage to act and to go on acting, despite setbacks and without the assurance of success, we must feel in some degree faith that our actions are justified beyond history.

(continued from page 16)

tainly other aspects to the current use of "religion" as the context for political action, but these are largely in the area of an abstract moralism which may often give rise to a profound sense of guilt without any real sense of sin. There is also the widespread feeling that religion is supposed to result in "confident living," whatever that is—which is often in the form of individual euphoria without regard to political developments and their consequences on individual as well as social life.

American society has tended to accept the two basic illusions of the solution of problems and the unqualified rightness of conduct as normative for a long time. They certainly are not the possession of any particular group or school of thought or party. They are rather the marks of the secular spirit of our times. Yet, it does seem to be the case that the present Administration gives them a more systematic and doctrinaire allegiance than did its predecessor which was a little more pragmatic and

flexible in its use of them. Be that as it may, it takes more than elections to change the basic situation.

The particular form of religiousness which seems to be becoming an official mode makes the situation that much more complex. While it may not be realistic to expect any political administration seriously to transcend the spirit of the age which brought it to power, a spurious self-transcendence is perhaps worse than none at all. To acknowledge the Lord without recognizing his Lordship—exercised in history through judgment and redemption—is to seek to make God a tutelary divinity of those who make the acknowledgement. This is, of course, a constant temptation of men in every age, regardless of cultural changes, but it does seem that official religiousness, to the extent that it is sincere and more than a gambit in public relations, is a form of using blinders at the same time that there are very serious problems to be dealt with.

It is my considered opinion that the prac-

(continued on page 31)

Symposium: Ethics, Theology, and Public Policy

INTRODUCTION

GEORGE D. YOUNGER

Few areas of Christian discussion today are more crucial than the one involving the nexus of theology, ethics and public policy decisions. It is an area of continuing inquiry for the World Council of Churches as it seeks to define "the responsible society." It is an area where only a few have dared to attempt basic formulations while many have contented themselves with living from hand to mouth on cheap homiletical catch-phrases. Yet it is also an area of the deepest importance as we face national policy decisions that strain the limits of past precedents and inherited value systems.

The four men who were chosen to participate in this symposium were picked because it was supposed that they represented important differences in the way theology and ethics can be applied to matters of public policy. But, when they came together to prepare to present their papers to the Christian Action conference at Howard University, it was quickly apparent that their respective points of view were not so antagonistic as others had thought them to be. In fact, for a moment it seemed as if there would be no symposium on a basis of "no contest."

It was decided, therefore, to frame the short papers in the form of answers to the question, "What resources of the Christian faith is it most important to emphasize at the present time?" The reader should notice that the question was framed as a question of *emphasis*, and no attempt was made by any of the panel members to present a completely balanced position or to fill out the particular points that were stressed. He should also remember that these writers were limited to those elements which they felt to be most important at this point in history, a limitation that kept them from giving adequate credit to the very influences

that have been most influential in shaping their own thought.

This was the basis on which this discussion proceeded. It proved to be a very stimulating one, for it carried those fortunate enough to be present directly into a fruitful interchange on problems of basic approach to matters of public policy.

Nothing is less successful than an attempt to recapitulate a lively conversation for a reader. But it would be well to note that none of the four emerged from the discussion unchallenged.

Robert M. Brown's stress on the sovereignty of God and the prevailing sin of idolatry was questioned by those pressing for a greater reliance on the doctrines of justification by faith and sanctification. Francis O. Ayers' emphasis on the life in Christ, especially in the Body of Christ, his Church, was felt by some to encourage Christian self-righteousness and to ignore the unconscious evidences of God's grace in those outside the Christian community.

William L. Miller's concept of the "common good" was set beside the more traditional theological category of the kingdom of God, which is not completely realizable in human history. And Edward L. Long's statement during the discussion that he had found he "must always wrestle with the compulsion of love" and felt constantly judged by its standards produced a disclaimer from those who could not see love as being a standard at all.

The conversation was lively. Whether it revealed only differences in matters of emphasis or differences in basic approach we leave for the reader to judge after having studied the papers. One thing is certain, however. This is a conversation that must be continued and carried into all its ramifications. The future usefulness of Christian

Action to the churches and to the world may depend on how willing we are to explore further this nexus of theology, ethics and public policy decisions.

NOTE: William L. Miller's presentation in the symposium will appear in more extended form in a forthcoming issue of *Christianity and Society*.

I.

EDWARD L. LONG, JR.

The word "moralism" has turned out to be the whipping post at this conference. In the worship meditations, the addresses, and the discussions we have evidenced a distrust of moral idealism, especially a bland irrelevant kind of hopefulness that lacks the ability to take specific stands and implement its professions.

We would do well critically to re-examine our prevailing sentiments at this point. Our group, properly sensitive as it is to the failures of irrelevant idealism, tends to flay moral idealism rather than to channel it to concrete modes of action. This verbal bombast can itself be a potential type of irrelevance if this is the main burden of our witness.

We were properly told in one discussion that morals are involved in decisions. Structure and standard are interrelated. The religious community is tempted to break this interrelatedness with a pious or platitudinous statement of standards lacking structural implications. The political or secular community on the other hand is tempted to break the same interrelatedness with a coldly calculating use of structural feasibility as the sole, or at least main, criterion of action. We in Christian Action have been fathered by a tradition in religious thought dedicated to avoid both of these errors.

There are still segments in the life of our nation where irrelevant moral idealism needs to be challenged, but there are equally large segments where it has gone completely overboard. Therefore our task is two fold not single fold. We must challenge irrelevant moral idealism with the type of critique most evident in the conference but we must also restate norms and standards as

we see these in Christian love (taken as a norm) to an age which has either forgotten them or rejected them. To our age the prophetic word will be different from what it was to an age, or more exactly, a church full of optimistic pacifism and bland social welfarism.

In foreign policy we are no longer in danger of sentimentality but rather of so affirming a harsh political realism as to lack creative and outgoing elements. Point IV may have been conceived in self-interest but it gained widespread acceptance for idealistic motives and it has not been idealism that has scuttled it. The sense of humility and cooperation we so desperately need in the Western alliance, the willingness which must be developed to help others without exploiting or bossing them—certainly these would not be destroyed by a restatement of Christian ethical imperatives as these are derived from Christian love. I must confess a sense of uneasiness over the way in which this group, and others like it supposedly bearing a Christian witness, make power and structural calculations without mention of the ambiguity and compromise of Christian love which we originally were taught that these entail.

We can be aided in appreciating the judgment of God upon any enterprise by the knowledge of an ethical standard which transcends that enterprise. The very transcendence of the norm is an occasion for irrelevance if wrongly used but a source of judgment and therefore of health if rightly employed. The error of the moralistically pious approach is not in having norms but in wrongly using them and in attempting to integrate life on the ethical rather than the religious level.

In the domestic scene we are every day losing sight of constitutional principles and the safeguards which such principles and ideals furnish against the rule of democracy becoming sheer power politics. In face of this development, evidenced in mccarthyism but not confined to it, we can take two lines of approach. Many are urging that we learn to accept the facts of political life as we find it and play the game for benefit of our ends which we believe to be just and

right. But we might also do service to our nation at this juncture in its history by challenging the game to have rules—the kind of rules that distinguish a high civilization from a barbarian one and a democratic nation from totalitarian power structures. Restatement of the Christian basis of political freedom is sorely needed now.

I would like to employ a metaphor here. Consider the arena of social action as a jungle into the midst of which we have been placed by fate. To take any effective action in the jungle we need an axe to chop down underbrush and ward off lions—but we will also do well with a map and a sense of direction so we may do our cutting in a purposeful pattern. About the need for the axe (forgotten in too much of the optimistic thought of bygone days) the polemics of our literature has been most explicit, but not quite as emphatic has been mention of the need for the map. Surely we must not do less than to state the grounds out of which policy ought to spring. The “neo-orthodox” thinkers apparently inherited from the social gospel an element of idealism and a sense of the demands of love which we have not in turn inherited from them. Consequently the thought of men like Reinhold Niebuhr was dialectical in a sense in which the type of discussion we have had here does not seem to be.

If we approach either domestic or foreign issues simply by suggesting we don’t approve of the present policies of the right wing but cannot furnish a clear critique of the fundamental errors; if we accept the sense of our own group on issues of controversy—follow a CA line—rather than engage in independent judgments guided by our understanding of Christian love (made relevant in middle axioms); if we are partisans without being able to tell why—then we may be accused of having broken the tension between structure and principle and of failing to bring the light of the gospel to bear upon the social issues of our time.

II.

FRANCIS O. AYERS

In answer to the question, “What are the resources of the Christian faith most impor-

tant to emphasize *now* in relation to decision and action in public policy?” I would use the words from the fifteenth chapter of St. John, “Abide in me and I in you.” Whatever is meant by abiding in Christ and He in us is most important, for “apart from me you can do nothing.”

I believe we are meant to take this quite literally. Apart from “abiding” we can do no good thing. St. Augustine said, “The virtues of the pagans are splendid vices.” Not only does action apart from abiding simply confirm us in our pride and arrogance but it also adds our witness to that of the modern world that God is optional. This is, I am sure, elementary, but it is exactly what we are most apt to forget when we become involved in political action and it is exactly that without which Christian action is impossible.

Although the passage does not say what abiding means, we have to make the attempt of defining it for obvious reasons. It has always seemed to me that these first eleven verses of the fifteenth chapter are the Johannine parallel to St. Paul’s teaching about the Body of Christ. Abiding has to do with life in the Christian community. The word community has been so overworked, however, that it may help to use the word “abiding” in its place.

I want to try in two ways to say what I take the term to mean: first by listing the conditions which have to be met before I can be said to act in a fully Christian way; and then, to say something about the structure of life within which Christian action becomes possible. I do not mean, of course, that all of these conditions have to be met before we can speak of Christian action. Much less do I mean that if all the conditions I name are met Christian action will automatically follow.

The conditions I would list are:

1. We must allow ourselves to be confronted by the Word of God.
2. We must draw on the riches of the Christian tradition, on science and on learning in general to understand the Word. I want to stress our responsibility and especially the responsibility of a group such as Christian Action to make these riches avail-

able in a form which can be used by the average member of the Body. When I read the major works of Tillich and Niebuhr I feel as though I had a bear by the tail. The average layman feels as though he had been thrown into a den of hungry kodiaks.

3. We must find support, acceptance, and encouragement both (and the two are inseparable) in our fellow Christians and in God.

4. We must give ourselves to personal prayer and discipline.

5. We must submit ourselves to the discipline, need, and judgment of our fellow Christians. This means, of course, that there must be a discipline in the fellowship. If a man wants to learn how he can act as a Christian in his every-day life you cannot put him into the usual men's club with its ashes and dishes activity and expect him to get anywhere at all. Moreover, a Christian cannot make up his mind as though he had only himself to consider. During the last war a pastor who was a pacifist told me that he had nothing to say to the men who went from his parish into the service. There were more than three hundred men and women from his parish serving in the armed forces to say nothing of the families and friends whom they had left behind. I submit that under such circumstances a man would have to resign as the pastor of a congregation for he is no longer able to meet the needs which are there. Finally, I believe that we must submit ourselves to the articulate judgment of the Christian fellowship before making major decisions. I do not believe, for instance, that a man casts his vote as a Christian in an election until he has discussed the issues with other Christians from a Christian point of view.

6. We must be free to make our own decision and we must leave others free. I do not mean, of course, that a Christian is free to make any decision whatsoever. Nevertheless, there were, presumably, Christians voting for both Stevenson and Eisenhower in the last election.

I would like to speak now of the structure of life which we must share with other Christians if we are to take seriously the command to abide. We must study the Bible

together remembering condition two above. There is no better way to allow oneself to be confronted by the Word of God than to read it in the fellowship as well as by oneself as long as what the Bible has to say is discussed in terms of the real problems in political, economic, family, and other areas of our common life. In the second place, we must have a liturgy which is relevant to our daily lives. In the third place, we must pray together. Our experience at Parishfield leads us to believe that the lack of personal prayer among Christians today is in large part due to the absence of informal, corporate prayer among them. Finally, we must share together with our fellow Christians in intimate discussion the real problems, failures, joys, and fulfillment of our life in the world. I do not mean that this is an end in itself but is the way in which we can seek God's will together. As Bonhoeffer says, "The Christian needs another Christian who speaks God's Word to him. He needs him again and again when he becomes uncertain and discouraged, for by himself he cannot help himself without belying the truth. He needs his brother man as a bearer and proclaimer of the divine word of salvation."

There are those who feel that an emphasis such as I have been making is an "other worldly" one. Man being as he is we can use anything for an escape. What I have been trying to describe is the way in which we open ourselves to the Holy Spirit so that God can act in and through us as members of the Body. In my experience a discussion of whether anything will happen or not is very much like two men debating whether there will be any visible results if one of them picks up the loose end of a live wire which is lying in front of them.

(continued from page 12)

ably due less to inappropriate concepts than to insufficient concepts. Above all, economic analysis can make highly useful policy contributions, not by establishing the rightness or wrongness of a given program, but by illuminating the systematic consequences of that program's adoption. In this capacity the counsel of traditional economic thought might well be more widely sought.

REVIEWS

The Peril of Sophistication

Against the Stream, by Karl Barth; Philosophical Library, New York City; 1954; 252 pp.; \$3.75.

This volume contains the occasional essays and writings of Barth between the years 1946-52. In addition it embodies in one chapter his little study entitled "Church and State" which appeared in the German as "Christusgemeinde und Bürgergemeinde." This chapter is perhaps the most valuable in the book. Most of the themes deal with the relevance of the Christian faith to the pressing international issues of our day, and seek to explain why Barth, the inspirer of Christian resistance to Nazism, should be the most outstanding Christian neutralist of our day. In an exchange of letters with Barth, Emil Brunner puts the issue very well in the statement, "I simply cannot understand why you, of all people, who condemned so severely even the semblance of collaboration of the church with Hitler, should now be making yourself the spokesman of those who condemn, not merely outward, but inward spiritual resistance, and why you should deride as 'nervousness' what is really revulsion from a truly diabolical system of injustice and tyranny." Karl Barth's answer is to make a distinction between the "nihilism" and "militarism" of the Nazi movement and the evil of communism which is "distant" from Christians and "can be easily discerned." He cannot "see why it should be the duty of the Church to give theological backing to what every Christian can read in the daily papers and what is admirably expressed by Mr. Truman and the Pope." One fails to catch the relevance of this remark. Barth seems to suggest that the Church must stand against evils to which Christians might be tempted but meanwhile it does not have to bother about evils which are no temptation to Christians.

Meanwhile, Barth acts as a kind of pope to the church in Hungary. Part of the volume is devoted to his speeches on the occasion of his pontifical journey there. On that

journey he assures his followers that "the state in reality moves between the two poles, of a pure ordinance of God and as a diabolical perversion"; but that these two limits do not really exist in history. *Ergo* we do not have to worry too much about what seems to us to be a diabolical perversion. As for the incorporation of Hungary into the eastern bloc, Barth declares complacently that Christians are "trying to see the judgment of God in all this. For the moment, they are determined to endure without grumbling and resentment, and in any case they intend to make it the basis from which they look out into the future." There are many indications that Barth shares his friend Hromadka's "wave of the future" theory.

In spite of Barth's constant insistence that the Christian must not look at political reality in terms of "systems" but only in terms of "concrete reality," it is obvious that in addition to his theological transcendentalism, which insists on viewing this troubled globe from a religious airplane which effaces all distinctions between good and evil (a reversion to his pre-Nazi position), he is also informed by devotion to "systems," particularly the Marxist notion that a "capitalist" nation must be bad, that, therefore, American "money worship" must be condemned, and our "hypocrisy" must be balanced against Russian cruelty.

In short these essays reveal political naiveté, posing in the guise of theological sophistication, together with a consequent incapacity to make any prudent or sensible political and moral judgments. The whole performance prompts revulsion against every pretension to derive detailed political judgments from ultimate theological propositions. When a man lacks ordinary common sense in reacting against evil, no theological sophistication will help him. He may even, as Barth, think that the distinction of moment for Christians is that the Nazis tried to corrupt Christianity while communism only tries to kill it.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

Concern for the People

Peoples' Padre, Autobiography by Emmett McLaughlin; Beacon Press, Boston; 1954; 260 pp. \$3.95.

Five years ago the subject of this volume, both the person and the events which give him prominence were in the newspaper headlines. Whether or not the reader remembers the news accounts of that day, anyone will find these autobiographical pages absorbing reading. Unless he is completely prejudiced he will have to agree that the autobiography is the self-portraiture of a very impressive person, gifted beyond the ordinary mortal with the graces of courage and charity.

Briefly told, Emmett McLaughlin was a Franciscan Priest, born of poor Irish stock in California, and called after his novitiate to a poor parish in Phoenix, Arizona. There his passion for the poor of his parish, and particularly his devotion to the Negro and Mexican children, soon revealed that his ministry would not be of a conventional pattern. The young Padre not only was prompted by a strong sense of justice but was gifted with a great deal of resourcefulness in social engineering. His first triumph was the organization of Negro baseball teams. From there his activities spread until he became the head of a large hospital and of the Federal Housing Authority in Phoenix. His fame spread throughout the land, as his influence grew in Phoenix. But all this success led to a growing tension with the superiors of his Order. It was felt that his interests were too secular for a Franciscan. His superiors ordered him to give up his position in the hospital. He defied them. After consulting with his friends he decided to reverse his policy of awaiting excommunication for his defiance. He resigned from the church. He was able despite the turmoil to maintain his position of leadership in the State, particularly in matters of health and housing. Naturally the issue which caused his final break with the church was but the culmination of a whole series of disagreements and tensions. A man with the initiative and resourcefulness, which he exhibited in his social work,

was obviously miscast as a member of a religious order requiring absolute obedience. Furthermore, he was at serious variance with the church on all matters pertaining to sex. He thought celibacy unnatural and could not accept the church's attitude on contraception. He was baffled by opposition to his clinics for venereal diseases, and by the reason given for the opposition, namely, that the clinics interfered with God's punishment upon promiscuity. Most of all he objected to the consistently negative attitude toward sex, including the sexual basis of the marriage relationship. Given these objections to a basic ecclesiastical policy (objections which would seem valid to a non-Catholic) the break was practically a foregone conclusion. In contrast to the traditional confessions of ex-Priest, Mr. McLaughlin does not believe that sexual aberrations within the church are at all common and thinks that this comparative health is an achievement, since it must be established in a situation in which a basic human impulse has been denied.

The story proceeds without bitterness until it reaches its conclusion and the author records the vituperation and calumny which were prompted by his final break with the church, and then again upon his marriage with one of the nurses in his hospital. Religious people should find this part of the story sobering. It proves that religious faith which, at its best, can generate real charity is also frequently the source of a very uncharitable fanaticism. And that is true of every type of faith, if it carelessly gives ultimate sanctity to historically relative interests, opinions and standards.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

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Christian Ethics

Conscience and Compromise, by Edward LeRoy Long, Jr.; Philadelphia, Westminster Press; 1954; 165 pp.; \$3.00.

Dr. Long has given us one of the best comprehensive discussions of the application of Christian ethics which I know. He may antagonize some readers because of his

effort to revive the word casuistry. However, he carefully avoids a legalistic type of casuistry. He does not try to tell us in advance what should be done in specific cases, each of which is unique. He has learned from Dr. Niebuhr and others about all the dangers in Catholic legalism. On the other hand, he sees clearly that Protestants need more guidance than they are getting concerning the way in which they relate the absolute standard of love to the ambiguous problems which call for decision. He shows how dangerous it is to make the adjustment without knowing on what principle we do it.

More than half of the book is devoted to the need of casuistry and to a very wise discussion of the structure of any complicated moral decision. Dr. Long then illustrates his principles by discussing their application to various areas of personal and social life. He even dares to discuss such issues as smoking, drinking, and swearing but rest assured that he does not decide in advance what you should do about them! He does point to some of the issues involved and I think that what he says about drinking, though brief, makes more sense than anything that I have read or heard on the subject. He deals beautifully and helpfully with some of the problems connected with sex and marriage.

Dr. Long has done his most profound thinking on the ethics of war. He wrote a book about this in the context of the atomic problem. He comes back to it again. He is a pacifist whose confident pacifism has been spoiled by long exposure to Dr. Niebuhr's thought and yet he cannot avoid raising the pacifist question when he is faced with a too confident statement of the opposite

(Continued from page 24)

tical problems involved in meeting domestic issues is seriously complicated by an uncritical acceptance of the necessity to make technically complete solutions and the need to be righteous while making them.

position. He sees that the pacifist is often irrelevant with his perfectionism but he is fearful of what he calls the "adaptionism" of the non-pacifist. He is worried because "as warfare gets increasingly violent and unreserved the pacifist voice in the Christian Church should become increasingly weaker." I should agree with that if more pacifists would learn from him that their position, while involving different ambiguities from that of the non-pacifist, is still a morally ambiguous one. It is easier for non-pacifists to be corrected by pacifists who acknowledge this as Dr. Long does.

In the final chapter Dr. Long shows that Christian ethics cannot be self-sufficient, that the Christian life depends upon the grace of God. Only those who know the forgiveness and the power which belongs to this dimension of "faith beyond ethics" can live and act in this world without either despairing or losing their Christian sensitivity.

JOHN C. BENNETT

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